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Stephen Turner’s book Explaining the Normative (Polity, Oxford, 2010) constitutes 
a powerful onslaught against one of the main intellectual havens where the thesis of 
something like a transcendental foundation for rationality is still alive and flourishing. 
During the two last centuries, naturalism has been conquering one territory after another, 
but there was a portion of philosophical land where it seemed that ordinary scientific 
research would necessarily be insufficient to offer us an account of what happened there. 
This thesis has often been expressed as the ‘irreducibility of normativity’ (see Parfit 2011 
for a recent exposition), and Turner’s book aims at showing that the arguments sup-
porting this thesis are not defensible. I am absolutely sympathetic to the claim that the 
normative is just an ordinary citizen of the natural world, though probably more complex 
than other vulgar things like neutron stars, hurricanes or lizards, but my own impression 
reading the book has been that Turner tries perhaps to go a little bit farther than where 
I would be happy to take company with him, and I shall try here to explain the slight 
differences I see in our ways of understanding the question, albeit running the risk of 
misinterpreting some of his claims of course.
I have to make a confession to begin with. A large part of my own work in analytical 
philosophy of science has been inspired by the idea that, besides analysing the ‘internal’ 
structure and dynamics of ‘purely epistemic states’ (i.e., what makes of something a 
theory, or a case of empirical confirmation, or a case of approximation to the truth, etc.), 
it was convenient to look at ‘scientific objects’ as the result of the decisions of human 
agents (i.e., scientists), and those decisions would not only be guided by ‘epistemic 
interest’, but also by ‘social’ ones. Most of the work done in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge in the last quarter of the past century tended to interpret the ‘epistemic’ and 
the ‘social’ as not only different, but usually conflicting aspects and forces within the 
possible motivations of scientists, with an increasingly smaller space left to the former 
as we approached the more radical, relativistic brands within the discipline. Looking for 
some approach in which the ‘epistemic’ and the ‘social’ could be conceived as coherent, 
complementary, and even interdependent elements of the process of scientific research, 
I came across Robert Brandom’s breathtaking theoretical fabric as disclosed in his book 
Making it Explicit, and found in his notions of commitment, entitlement and scorekeeping 
a particularly apt methodological tool to represent the dynamics of scientific research in 
terms of a ‘conversation’ governed by a system of inferential rules. These are rules that 
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help scientist to ‘keep score’ of the contributions and burdens of each participant, and 
such that the explanation of why a scientific community adopts the rules it adopts might 
be given in terms of a combination of ‘epistemic’ and ‘social’ goals (i.e., only norms that 
are efficient enough in helping scientists to satisfy both types of goals would be accep-
ted). The idea, then, of rational behaviour (in this case, the behaviour of scientists, but I 
am sure the idea can be made much more general so as to cover most of social action) 
as explainable by the agents’ submission to the validity of some norms governing the 
dynamics of their (i.e., the agents) obligations and permissions was a framework I found 
considerably apt to explain both why science is ‘just’ a social battlefield and an effi-
cient institution in the production of something like objective knowledge. Of course, this 
approach needed to assume the existence of norms and norm-guided behaviour, though 
in no moment did I doubt the possibility of giving an account of both things within a plainly 
naturalistic framework. In fact, I found it surprising that the reluctance of Brandom and 
other philosophers in the ‘inferentialist’ school was taken as ‘naturalist’, since it was more 
or less obvious that, after all, what Brandom was doing could be phrased precisely as 
an attempt to describe and analyse what type of behaviour (empirically determinable by 
means of just good-old-fashioned descriptive, non-normative concepts) should an empi-
rically given being display in order to be classified as engaging in a Sellarsian ‘game-for-
giving-and-asking-for-reasons’; a kind of analysis that is still more obvious in Brandom’s 
later book, Between Saying and Doing. So, I confess I wanted to have my cake and eat 
it too: to  have both a description and explanation of social behaviour (and even rational 
behaviour in general) in terms of norms, commitments, reasons, ‘proprieties’, and the 
like, and also staying within a ‘safe’ naturalistic worldview which accepts that all that 
there is is what the best confirmed theories of our empirical sciences tell us there is. I 
celebrate, hence, Stephen Turner’s book as a deep and clever attempt to deconstruct 
the anti-naturalist transcendentalism (what he calls ‘normativism’) that transpires in much 
of the literature on norms and norm-guided behaviour, and in particular in many philoso-
phical theories about the ‘nature of rationality’. However, I think that Turner’s argument 
is also dangerously close to throwing the baby of normativity away with the bathwater of 
normativism.
Normativism, i.e., the thesis that every form of rational thinking presupposes the exis-
tence of non-naturalisable normative facts and has to assume the validity some kind of 
Grundnorm self-evident to all rational agents, can be rightly critized, as Turner does, for 
necessarily resting on circular arguments, for accepting the existence of some type of 
queer facts not connectable to the natural causal order, for resting in the end on confu-
sing metaphors, and for many other sins that make it suspicious of too closely resembling 
the old-fashioned supernatural entities of traditional theology, like God’s and our rational, 
immortal soul’s ghastly capabilities. But is it really necessary to dispense with normativity, 
i.e., the fact that there are such things in the world as norms and norm-guided behaviour 
in order to erase transcendental normativism from our intellectual zoo? The problem 
here is the usual one within the discussions about reductionism: should the reductionist 
attempt to explain the emergence of the ‘reduced’ things, events and properties?, or 
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should he (for the reductionist is typically a male in our philosophical imaginary) explain 
those things away? Perhaps I am not being fair to the aim of Turner’s book, but my rea-
ding of it leads me to think that his argument is more of the second, ‘eliminativist’ type. 
Consider, for example, the following quotation:
Is there a fact that there are meanings and oughts? Or is merely a fact that people 
understand one another and that they have beliefs about obligations, or that (given that 
obligation is a local notion of our culture and time) that we can interpret as being about 
obligations? (op. cit., 188)
When molecular biologists explain chromosomes on the basis of their chemical pro-
perties, they are not trying to deny that ‘there is a fact that there are chromosomes’; they 
want, rather, to explain why chromosomes are the way they are. Even when (to cite what 
is perhaps the most famous example of reductionism) physicists explain the appearance 
of the rainbow, they do not deny that ‘there are’ rainbows: these are simply a concrete 
species of optical phenomena. Cannot we take the same ‘scientific’ attitude towards 
meanings and oughts? Of course, meanings and obligations only ‘emerge’ when some 
very specific type of cognitive systems allow them to emerge, which includes the fact 
that some conscious agents understand, undertake and attribute those meanings and 
obligations, as rainbows only appear when some image producing device exists and is 
focused towards the right direction in the right circumstances. The critical point is that an 
acceptable naturalistic explanation of normative facts like meanings and commitments 
could not merely consist in directly identifying them with the beliefs of agents about them; 
i.e., my obligation of paying, say, €25,000 in income tax this year does not consist in my 
believing that I must do it, nor in the belief that such is the case by someone in the tax 
office, nor is of course something like a ‘collective belief’. It can indeed happen that I 
actually have the obligation of paying €25,000 this year, whereas my own belief about it is 
a different one (for example, I may have unconsciously miscalculated my tax return, and 
think that what I have to pay is €25,009), and that nobody else actually has any belief at 
all about this issue (for my tax return may be checked automatically by a computer that 
has been programmed so as not to inform about differences of less than €10). Of course, 
from a naturalist point of view my obligation, as a normative fact, cannot be but somehow 
constituted by some psychological attitudes of some flesh-and-bone people (viz., their 
beliefs and decisions about the creation of the norms regarding income tax, and about 
the legitimacy of the institutions and processes establishing the tax), but it does not con-
sist in anyone’s beliefs that I have such and such specific obligation, for the latter beliefs 
can, as any other kind of beliefs, be right or wrong.
We can say something similar regarding Turner’s attempt to dispense with transcen-
dental explanations of rationality (i.e., those assuming that the existence of irreducibly 
normative facts is a prerequisite of any kind of rational thought) by resource to Donald 
Davidson’s well known but probably not often well interpreted ideas about rationality and 
the ‘charity principle’. Turner is right in pointing out an important shortcoming of the trans-
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cendental approaches: there being committed to the assumption that one that violated 
some principle of rationality (e.g., consistency) would be ‘irrational,’ and hence ‘unintelli-
gible’. The fact, Turner insists, is that in general we can pretty well understand the people 
that, according to our own views, have some self-contradictory beliefs or support claims 
that lead to contradictions; we simply consider that they are wrong. Davidson’s point that 
understanding someone implies being in agreement with most of what he or she thinks 
allows, on the one hand, that two people are in disagreement about some things, but 
on the other hand, and more importantly, it does not commit us to the claim that they 
must share something like a ‘kernel’ of a priori, universal rationality principles. Instead, 
following Turner’s interpretation, it only commits us to the idea that rational conversation 
and interaction is guided by ‘empathy’: my capability of ‘seeing what you are behind’, i.e., 
of tracking your own chains of arguments; a capability that can be given a plainly ‘natu-
ralistic’ explanation through our knowledge of neural systems (e.g., mirror neurons, and 
the like), and does not need any kind of ‘transcendental foundation’. The problem is that 
when I discover that some of your ideas are wrong, I am not simply ‘following your chain 
of arguments’. In a way, I am following your arguments while simultaneously following 
my own arguments, and seeing that both chains lead to contradictory results; but often it 
is the case that what I find is that it is you who is not correctly following your own chains 
of reasons. So, in order to assess your beliefs, I have to make a distinction between the 
process of reasoning you are actually carrying out, and the process of reasoning you 
should be carrying out (of course, each of us can, and even must, apply this very same 
distinction to our own selves).
Does this entail that we have to presuppose something like irreducible normative 
facts? I don’t think so. What is necessary is that when we attribute a belief to some-
body (or to ourselves), we not only identify that belief with a ‘mental state’, but with a 
particular kind of mental state, namely the state of treating the content of that state as 
something that is subject to reasons, i.e., to say it in Brandomian jargon, the state of 
undertaking the commitment to revise that belief if compulsory arguments show it must 
be revised. But, what a kind of psychological state is this? The idea behind Turner’s 
strategy of naturalisation-through-empathy was, as far as I understand it, to consider only 
the causal dispositions within the working of the other’s brain (and all the relevant things), 
and ‘follow’ these dispositions as far as possible. Stated differently, to empathise with 
someone’s reasoning would consist in something like being capable of predicting what 
he or she will or would affirm under relevant circumstances. This includes our capacity 
to make counterfactual, subjunctive judgments about the linguistic behaviour of others, 
but nothing in this assumption goes against the hypotheses that all the relevant process 
is grounded on physical, natural capabilities, for counterfactual judgments are, after all, 
common in any area of natural science or its application. But what we are now trying to 
‘predict’ is not what the agent will do or say, but what she should do or say, i.e., what 
she would do or say were she appropriately honouring her commitments. Normativists 
would argue that this is not anything like an empirical prediction, but I think, with Turner, 
that we don’t need to follow them in this point: the only thing we need to transform this 
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prediction into an empirical one is an empirical description of what lines of behaviour or 
reasoning are ‘appropriate’ to the commitments of the agent. Of course, this can only be 
done in a tentative, incomplete and perspective fashion: each agent will have her own 
(and probably mistaken at some point) ideas about what lines of action are appropriate 
to such and such commitments; ideas that she can apply rightly or wrongly, but it is 
according to these ideas that she will make her ‘predictions’ about what others ‘should’ 
do. Note that the fact that the term ‘appropriately’ occurs within my phrase ‘were she 
appropriately honouring her commitments’ does not presuppose any ‘irreducible’ notion 
of ‘appropriateness’ (i.e., one which is not ultimately accountable in terms of the actual 
attitudes of some subjects), for it has to be understood in the sense of ‘appropriately from 
my own point of view’, i.e., from the point of view of the person assessing the linguistic or 
cognitive behaviour of the other agent. What I (counterfactually) predict in saying what it 
is that the other person should do, is what she would do if her behaviour corresponded 
to what would be an appropriate compliance with her commitments according to my own 
interpretation of those commitments.
In conclusion, I am optimistic about the possibility of reducing normativity to either 
biological or social ‘natural’ processes, but this reduction would certainly not consist in 
‘explaining away’ normative facts. Instead it would involve showing how the particular 
kinds of psychological attitudes we are capable of constitute such a complex game of 
mutual interactions in which ‘being obliged’ or ‘being entitled’ consist in. And I am sure 
that Stephen Turner’s book on Explaining the Normative would be a remarkable miles-
tone in the collective argument leading to that conclusion.
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